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I.
Richard Posner is disappointed in his colleagues.
As the technical complexity of the federal docket continues
to ratchet upward, judicial competence is losing pace. When it
comes to factually intricate cases, forget properly resolving
them—in Posner’s view, judges often have difficulty parsing them.
This is not terribly surprising. Causes of action today rest on more
esoteric grounds than ever before: rapidly evolving technologies,
“exotic” financial instruments, counterintuitive economic
principles. Even federal judges, who tend toward the highly
intelligent side, are liable to get confused. The deeper problem,
and the one that truly motivates Posner’s critique in Reflections
on Judging, is that judges are exerting little effort to catch up.
More than that, actually: according to Posner, the issue today is
not only that social and technological change outpaces judicial
comprehension. It is that many judges have responded to such
change by burrowing headfirst into the formalist sand, effectively
entrenching their own ignorance. The results, in Posner’s view,
have been disastrous: faux sophistication with a high-handed
stride—sophistry.
Posner’s claim is simple and convincing. He argues that
judges, bewildered by the involution of many cases today, have
succumbed to a collective reaction-formation. Rather than
grappling with the reality of factual and technological evolution—
1. Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University
of Chicago Law School.
2. Resident Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School. The author
would like to thank Jack Balkin, Linda Greenhouse, Andrew Tutt, and Carly Zubrzycki
for their insightful feedback.
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what Posner calls the growing “external complexity” of law—
judges have fixated on, and unwittingly multiplied, the law’s
“internal complexity” (pp. 1–17). The latter has two guises, the
first of which is doctrinal. Whether because judges have failed to
define abstract legal terms, or just the opposite—because judges
have tried too hard to define abstract terms, when plain language
does the job more crisply—Posner suggests that contemporary
doctrine often operates as an encumbrance rather than a guiding
light. One example is “proximate cause,” a tortured idea that, for
Posner, emblematizes the judicial “attempt to reduce a
heterogeneous body of phenomena to a single term” (p. 65).
The second guise of internal complexity might be termed
“stylistic.” Posner vociferously opposes legalese, and he despises
the “hypertrophy” of citations (p. 96). A few years ago, Posner
published an acerbic “review” of the Bluebook in the Yale Law
3
Journal, much of which has been woven into Reflections on
Judging (Chapter 3). But the problem, in Posner’s eyes, reaches
far beyond citation form. He sees the sprawling catastrophe of the
Bluebook—591 pages!—as symptomatic of deeper illness. Along
with other “barnacles of legal formalism,” it reflects an ethic of
insularity that has seeped into, and overtaken, judicial practice of
late (p. 104). The barnacles are numerous. Beyond “obsession
with citation form,” they include “fear of math and science,
insensitivity to language and culture, [the] mangling of history,
superfluous footnotes, verbosity, excessive quotation, readerunfriendly prose, exaggeration,” and (my favorite, I must say)
“bluster” (p. 104).
The alarm of these developments may well be self-evident.
For good measure, however, Posner elaborates a few reasons why
we should be disturbed. The first is that the judicial focus on
internal complexity necessarily diverts attention from its external
counterpart. Cognitive resources are limited; choices of emphasis
incur opportunity costs. And in Posner’s estimation, it is often
more important to work carefully through external complexity—
the actual facts—than it is to spend time hand-wringing over
doctrinal and stylistic niceties. Another reason to be disturbed: in
Posner’s view, doctrinal and stylistic niceties are not only
distracting. They are fatuous, an active hindrance to
interpretation. The overgrowth of doctrine, the artlessness of
legal jargon, the winding paragraphs that consist of nothing more
than string-citations; these and other sources of “internal
3.

See Richard Posner, The Bluebook Blues, 120 YALE L.J. 850 (2011).
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complexity” have combined to make judging, in reality a vanilla
process, seem almost mythical in substance and scope. Obscurity
has flourished in a realm where transparency ought to reign.
Posner’s solution is as straightforward as the problem he
diagnoses: “realism.” A realist judge, on Posner’s account, is one
who pays keen attention to facts, no matter how confusing they
are, and who asks, at every turn, what actually happened, what is
actually at stake. “The realist,” in short, “wants to impose a simple
style of legal analysis on a sure understanding of the scientific or
commercial complexities, factual rather than legal, out of which
cases arise” (p. 4).
By “simple,” Posner means not just stylistically simple, but
also analytically simple. For law, he writes, is not the “profound”
enterprise that we often imagine it to be; in fact, it is “one of the
simplest professional fields” (p. 354). The reason young judges are
rare is not that nascent legal minds are fallow compared to older
legal minds. The opposite may well be true (p. 255). The reason
young judges are rare is that conceptual dexterity is not equivalent
to sound judgment. While youth often brims with the former, the
latter, by nature, can only be honed with experience. In this
respect, Posner styles his “realism” explicitly in the vintage of
4
Holmes’ quip that “law is not logic but experience” (p. 6). This
inspires Posner to criticize formalism and grand academic theory
with equivalent fervor. He spends an entire chapter putting
Justice Scalia—the embodiment of judicial formalism—and Akhil
Amar—the embodiment of intellectual “dreaming”—equally to
the lash (Chapter 7).
The upshot is that judges today could stand to ease up on
professional technique—a major culprit of internal complexity—and
focus instead on cultivating practical wisdom. A key attribute of
realist judging, in this vein, is the ability to pare down. For Posner, a
successful realist opinion is one that begins with complicated facts,
reconstructs them in crisp, easy-to-understand language, and
efficiently conveys their legal significance. Posner illustrates this
point by an amusing show-and-tell. To punctuate Chapter Eight—
the “opinion writing” chapter—he takes the liberty of rewriting
United States v. Morris, a D.C. Circuit case about the sufficiency of
5
evidence to sustain a conviction for cocaine possession. The

4. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“[t]he life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience.”).
5. United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

6 - THE FACES OF JUDICIAL NAIVETE_BRENNAN_MARQUEZ (DO NOT DELETE)

260

2/25/2014 9:46 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:257

published opinion spans 3,237 words; Posner’s revision, far clearer
than the original, is slightly north of 600 (pp. 276–86).
In fact, the connection between realism and clear writing runs
deeper than first appearances might imply. To readers who “may
think it puzzling” that Posner emphasizes writing style alongside
“the ‘scientistic’ approach that [he seems] to be urging on judges,”
he admonishes, in a lovely little passage:
There is no inconsistency. For I’m not trying to turn judges into
scientists communicating in symbols and jargon. I’m urging
greater judicial recognition of the ever-increasing complexity
of the factual underpinnings of modern federal litigation. That
makes good judicial writing more rather than less
important. . . . Law must come to terms with modernity but will
remain a humanity, and should (p. 355).

And in hands deft as Posner’s, I daresay it will.
II.
A prevalent theme of Reflections on Judging is the
importance of simplicity and concision in legal argument. In
veneration of this ideal, and Posner’s propensity for upholding it,
I won’t waste time or ink going on about what Reflections on
Judging gets right. The answer is almost everything, and certainly
the most important things. The argument is spare and tight,
weaving nimbly between abstract propositions and concrete
examples. More than anything, though, what I find remarkable,
and admirable, about the book is the degree of exasperation that
Posner allows to simmer below the surface. It never becomes
pronounced enough to frustrate the book’s conceptual ambitions.
But the exasperation is also unrelenting. And rightly, for if
Posner’s account is correct, judges are essentially flying blind,
indeed, willfully multiplying their own blindness. The urgency of
this point is hardly a matter of taste or ideological preference. It
is a matter of professional obligation. Posner’s effort deserves
unqualified applause.
All of that in mind, I have two points to make about
Reflections on Judging: two criticisms, one could say, though the
term is not precisely apposite. More than anything, the points are
meant to supplement Posner’s already-deft analysis, not to
subtract from its accomplishments.
To begin with, a continual source of ambiguity in Reflections
on Judging, as in much of Posner’s previous work, is how much
confidence, and what sort of confidence, judges are supposed to
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inspire. In one sense, Posner wants to demystify the judicial role.
He dislikes the symbolic pedestal that judges occupy in our
society: it obscures what he understands to be the essentially
human, essentially political character of judicial decisions. Posner
is well known for holding the view that judging in our legal system
6
has an essentially “legislative character,” and for his avowed
commitment to “pragmatic,” which is to say, policy-based and
7
consequentialist, reasoning. More interesting than the merits of
this view—a subject of endless debate, to which I have nothing of
specific insight to add—is how it combines with what else Posner
says about judging. In Posner’s cosmos, judges are run-of-the-mill
public servants, pragmatic in both the colloquial and
philosophical sense, striving to bring about favorable policy
outcomes. Yet they are also prodigious intellects, virtually
omniscient—perhaps “clairvoyant” is the better term—about
what consequences their rulings hold in store. What the Posnerian
judge lacks in symbolic grandness is well compensated for in
8
epistemic grandiosity.
Take, for example, Posner’s views on administrative law. He
sees Chevron deference as a mechanism that judges use,
essentially at their convenience, to pass the buck on difficult
questions by indulging the “fiction” that “agencies have
‘expertise,’” when in fact “their adjudicators are poorly trained,
horribly overworked, highly politicized, or all of these things at
once” (p. 86). Later, doubling down on the same point, Posner
writes that the “strong norm of deference to the decisions of
administrative agencies,” as it currently operates in administrative
law, is “the fossil remnant of an era in which . . . progressives had
boundless faith in the potential of agencies as agents of reform”
(p. 123). There, Posner cannot agree with the progressives.
Lamenting the fact that Chevron, as an interpretive framework,
lumps all agency decisions together, Posner asks, “Must we . . .
accord equal deference to all administrative decisions? The realist
judge thinks not. The realist judge thinks that deference is earned,
not bestowed” (p. 123).
The swerve back to realism here is intriguing. What is the
relationship between (1) the proposition that judges should be
6. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 15 (2008).
7. See id., ch. 9. For an excellent reconstruction and critique of Posner’s
“pragmatist” commitments, see Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How
Judges Think, 108 MICH. L. REV. 859, 864–67 (2010).
8. See, e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 331-353 (2011) (describing the immodest
epistemology on which Posner’s theory of “pragmatic” judging rests).
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realists, and (2) the “deference is earned” thesis? Truth to tell, I
see none. To be a realist is not automatically to share Posner’s
faith in the prowess of judicial intellect. One can easily imagine
a judge who approaches legal interpretation realistically, in
Posner’s sense, and also believes that judges should defer to
agencies in precisely the manner Chevron prescribes. In fact, the
most compelling variant of the antithesis to Posner’s view—the
idea that deference is bestowed, not earned—rests precisely on
realist grounds. The whole point of a critique like Adrian
Vermuele’s, say, is that realistically, judges have far less facility
with specialized or technical areas of law than we commonly take
9
for granted.
The point is not that realism is incompatible with the
“deference is earned” thesis. Of course the commitments can be
reconciled. Posner is a walking example of a judge who
reconciles them. The point is that compatibility, as such, entails
no deeper relationship. One axis—realism v. formalism—is about
how judges should approach the cases they are institutionally
empowered to resolve. The other axis—deference v. nondeference—is about which cases those are.
So, on the assumption that Posner’s general call for “realism”
is well-founded, the question is: What should we realistically
expect from realist judges? An example of Posner’s own
fashioning underscores the difficulties of this question. Decrying
what he calls “judicial insouciance about the real,” Posner invokes
10
the well-known case of PGA Tour v. Martin (pp. 78–80). The
question presented in PGA Tour was whether the Americans with
Disabilities Act required the PGA Tour to permit a handicapped
golfer, Casey Martin, to compete, despite the Tour’s
determination that Martin’s use of a golf cart would
“fundamentally alter” the sport. The Court held for Mr. Martin.
Of the opinion, Posner had this to say:
Illustrative of judicial insouciance about the real is the
Supreme Court’s decision that allowing [Martin to use a golf
cart] would not “fundamentally alter the nature” of the PGA’s
tournament competitions, and therefore prohibiting him from
riding violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
9. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (developing a “second-best” theory of
administrative law, focusing on the comparative advantage that agencies have over courts,
rather than the absolute competency of courts). See also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009).
10. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
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Court’s opinions arbitrarily distinguished, without misgivings,
between “essential” and “inessential” rules of golf
tournaments. Yet how could such a determination be thought
within judicial competence? (p. 80).

In a sense, Posner is right: the inquiry of what makes for an
“essential” rule of golf does exemplify “judicial insouciance.” But
as far as Posner’s broader point is concerned, the example seems
misaimed by 180 degrees. For Posner, the observation of “judicial
insouciance” invites the inference that insouciance ought to be
overcome—if judges don’t understand how golf works, they
should learn. But another inference is possible and, in my view,
more natural. From the observation of “judicial insouciance,” one
could more simply conclude that the relevant subject matter is illsuited for judges. Posner may be right, in other words, that
determinations of “essential” versus “inessential” rules of golf fall
beyond “judicial competence.” But perhaps this speaks to the
boundaries of judicial competence, not to the importance of
having judges wise up about golf. One imagines that Justice Scalia,
who dissented in PGA Tour v. Martin largely on the basis of how
11
silly he found the “essential features of golf” inquiry, would
wholeheartedly agree with Posner’s lament about “judicial
insouscience.” For Scalia, however, the obvious next step would
be deference to the PGA’s determination—just the opposite of
12
Posner’s call-to-judicial-arms.
Posner, to his credit, is aware of this indeterminacy. After
thoroughly expounding the view that judges ought to learn more
about fields they do not understand—like golf—he back-pedals
somewhat, acknowledging that some questions do, in fact, fall
beyond the scope of judicial competence. In Posner’s words:
Responsible realist judges who acknowledge and embrace a
legislative function for the judiciary will confine its exercise to
areas not only in which formalist methods fall short, but which
judges understand. They must avoid the temptation to legislate
from the bench in a field about which they know little, whether
the field is gun control, legislative apportionment, the
administration of public schools, or public finance. These are
examples of areas in which a dose of “judicial self-restraint”
would be salutary (pp. 122–23).

A sensible caveat. My purpose is not to fault Posner for
conceding the limits of his position—very much to the contrary.
11.
12.

Id. at 699–703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 704.
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But the question is what it means, in practice, for realist judges to
be “responsible.” How are we supposed to distinguish between
domains in which judicial ignorance ought to be overcome, and
domains in which the same ignorance militates, instead, in favor
of “judicial self-restraint”? In other words: where did Posner
come up with this list? Is it supposed to be self-evident that gun
control is a field about which judges “know little,” while “complex
financ[e]”—to take an example of Posner’s own (p. 72)—is a field
that judges should strive to educate themselves about? The point,
of course, is not that it is impossible to distinguish between gun
control and financial engineering, or, more broadly, between
domains that are conducive to judicial expertise and those that are
not. Clearly the distinction can be drawn. In fact, it seems like an
appealing distinction. In some domains, judges should take care
to learn all they can; in other settings, judges are wiser to stay
away. But when it comes to navigating the distinction in practice,
the final chord of Reflections on Judging is disappointingly faint.
Posner concludes in equipoise.
III.
All of this is easy enough to forgive. Or better yet, no
forgiveness is necessary. Posner has taken up a far-reaching
problem—to call his solution partial hardly undermines the effort.
It just means that more work lies in store. Books, after all, are
finite artifacts. And if the problem has been well posed, that,
surely, is forward intellectual motion unto itself.
I am not sure, however, that Posner has the problem quite
right—at least, not exhaustively right. I agree with Posner that
insofar as judges are disavowing the existence of external
complexity, and erecting artificial forms of internal complexity in
its stead, adjudication suffers. Miscomprehension of facts, Posner
rightly points out, “retards” the enterprise of legal interpretation
(p. 8). I fear, however, that while Posner bangs the realist wardrum, an important distinction gets lost amid the clamor. It is one
thing to argue that factual comprehension is a necessary predicate
of legal interpretation. That seems virtually undeniable. If one
does not understand what happened, it is impossible to make legal
sense—or, really, any sense—of what it was that happened. Yet it
is quite another thing to claim that deeper familiarity with social
and technology complexity tends to inspire better interpretation.
This claim is normative, not just descriptive, in character. If we
imagine “judging” as a function—facts go in, holdings come out—
Posner wants to argue that judges immersed in contemporary
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technology have greater purchase not only on the factual inputs
of the function, but also on the function itself.
I do not resist this normative move full-stop. But it merits
qualification. Sometimes—certainly not in all circumstances, but
sometimes—it seems to me that what makes for sound
interpretation is not comfort and familiarity with the object being
interpreted, but critical distance from the object. Call it the
“wisdom of alienation.” It is far from self-evident that judicial
alienation from contemporary technology is, in every measure, a
bad thing. If the judicial role is, as I think it ought to be, partially
about helping to ensure that we live up to our own commitments
as a polity, a healthy dose of alienation may be just the ticket.
A pair of concrete examples will help to shore up the point.
Consider, first of all, United States v. Seiver, a Seventh Circuit case
that Posner takes to exemplify the perils of judicial estrangement
13
from technology (pp. 91–92). Seiver concerned the scope of
probable cause when evidence has become “stale.” After
determining that the defendant had uploaded child pornography
seven months prior, the police sought—and obtained—a warrant
to search his computer. The search yielded a cache of child
pornography, and the defendant was convicted of possessing child
pornography and sexually exploiting a child. On appeal, the
defendant argued that no probable cause existed for the warrant,
because it was unreasonable “to believe that seven months after
he had uploaded child pornography there would still be evidence
14
of the crime on his computer.” The state conceded the
defendant’s threshold argument—agreeing that the upload was
“stale” evidence—but it maintained that probable cause existed
anyway, because a single upload of child pornography reasonably
leads to the inference that the suspect is a “collector.” The state’s
position, in other words, was that even if the seven month time
lapse extinguished probable cause with respect to the uploaded
video, there was still probable cause to search for other child
15
pornography.
In Posner’s view, the state’s position in Seiver (as well as the
defendant’s view) “reflect[ed] a misunderstanding of computer
technology.” As Posner explained:
When you delete a computer file it goes into a ‘trash’ folder;
and when you ‘empty’ the folder . . . the contents, including the
13.
14.
15.

United States v. Seiver, 692 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 775.
Id.
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deleted file in question, disappear. But the files in the trash
folder have not left the computer. They have just been placed
in a part of the computer’s hard drive that you can’t [easily]
access . . . [but] [c]omputer experts employed by the FBI and
other law enforcement agencies can easily recover a deleted
file unless it has been overwritten [which is rare.] ‘Staleness’ is
relevant to probable cause when the object searched for is
perishable or consumable, like cocaine, but not when it is a
computer file (p. 92).

Seiver elegantly illustrates Posner’s point. Before one
understands the ontology of computer files, it may seem intuitive
for the “staleness” doctrine to apply to them (I confess it did for
me!). But once technological enlightenment dawns, it becomes
clear that the “staleness” doctrine applies, if at all, awkwardly,
and probably not at all.
No disagreement so far. What I want to stress, however, is
that Seiver encapsulates Posner’s view so easily because
widespread agreement exists about the purpose behind the
“staleness” doctrine. The situation would be quite different if
“staleness” represented a point of significant normative dispute.
To see why, consider another technologically imbued Fourth
Amendment case: United States v. Warshak, in which the Sixth
Circuit addressed whether criminal suspects enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the content of their email, even when
that email is stored on, and has thus been “disclosed to,” third16
party ISP providers. Presenting this question, Warshak touched
a constitutional nerve: it asked, in essence, whether the “thirdparty doctrine,” a longstanding fixture of Fourth Amendment
17
law, could survive the digital age.
Doctrinally, Warshak resolved into two warring analogies: Is
email storage more like sending a letter through the postal service
or more like disclosing information about one’s finances to a
bank? If email storage is like sending a letter, a suspect’s
expectation of privacy should stay intact. The government cannot
seize mail with impunity simply because the sender has turned it
16. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
17. This question has preoccupied recent scholarly writing on the Fourth
Amendment as well. See United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
Compare Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment ThirdParty Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011), with Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). The question has also come to the
attention of the Supreme Court.
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over to a courier service; that holding is among the Fourth
18
Amendment’s foundational cases. If, on the other hand, email
storage is like disclosing financial information to a bank, the
decision to keep email stored on an ISP server would vitiate a
suspect’s expectation of privacy in its content. Individuals have
the choice, the logic goes, to maintain a bank account, and by so
choosing, they lose Fourth Amendment protection over
19
“revealed” financial information. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit
favored the postal service analogy, a determination supported by,
among other things, “common sense,” common sense that the
court thought would be “def[ied]” if “emails [carried] lesser
20
Fourth Amendment protection [than traditional mail].”
Common sense is one thing; inattention to technological
reality, quite another. A serious problem freights the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion: although it refers, in one swoop, to a
defendant’s “reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a
21
commercial ISP,” there is an important difference between
sending an email and storing an email. In one case, the ISP plays
a courier role; it serves as “the intermediary that makes email
22
communication possible,” just like the postal service serves as
the intermediary that makes traditional mail possible. When
email is stored, however, the ISP’s role changes. No longer a
courier, it serves a function much more like a bank: one less about
communication with other people, more about allowing users to
keep track of their own affairs; and also one that depends, just like
23
bank records, on users’ “voluntarily convey[ed]” information.
Indulging some poetic license, imagine what Posner, donning
his realist cap, might have to say about the technological
ambiguity in Warshak. I am not trying to imply that Posner
necessarily would say this—only that it would be perfectly in
keeping with the logic and rhetorical pattern of his broader
argument:
Warshak is a good example of what happens when judges
fumble over computer technology. What the Warshak court
18. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
19. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes the risk,
in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the Government.”).
20. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–86.
21. Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 286.
23. Id. at 288.
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neglected to consider—because it did not really understand
how ISPs work—is that users have the choice to store email on
servers, and the typical user agreement, including the one in
this case, authorizes ISPs to access stored email at their
discretion. Therefore, by availing himself of email storage
service, a user opens himself to the risk that the holders of his
stored information will disclose it to police; just like someone
who takes advantage of banking services opens himself to the
risk that the bank will disclose account information to the
police. The court in Warshak makes much ado about “the
prominent role that email has assumed in modern
communication.” True enough, but this can’t be the feature of
email that carries the day. Storing money in a bank also plays a
“prominent role” in modern financial practice. But that does
not change its status under the Fourth Amendment.

My point is not that the Sixth Circuit got the Fourth
Amendment question wrong. To the contrary, like many
commentators, I regard United States v. Warshak as a lodestar of
24
constitutional privacy in the internet age. The point is that
Warshak differs in kind from Posner’s keystone example, United
States v. Seiver, despite their common foundation in the Fourth
Amendment. In Seiver, the relevant legal principle was the
subject of little to no controversy. Reasonable minds agree about
why the “staleness” doctrine exists—to ensure that evidence
procured in the past furnishes a basis for individualized suspicion
in the present—and the question was when, as a matter of fact,
computer files go “stale.” In Warshak, by contrast, observers
disagree intensely about how the relevant legal principle—the
third-party doctrine—should operate, and in some instances,
25
whether it should even exist. Approaching Warshak from a
purely doctrinal perspective yields two colorable analogies, and
the case seems a close question of Fourth Amendment law. But
approach Warshak from a more sharply normative vantage
point, and suddenly the case no longer seems all that close. It
starts to seem more like a paradigm case of what the Fourth
24. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment:
A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 700–01 (2011) (using Warshak as an
example of the way the third-party doctrine could “short cut” Fourth Amendment values);
Nicole Friess, When Rummaging Goes Digital: Fourth Amendment Particularity and Stored
Email Surveillance, 90 NEB. L. REV. 971, 973–76 (2012) (using the Warshak facts as a
keystone example of the “privacy invasions that result when particularity is lacking in the
context of [searches of] stored e-mails.”); Daniel Pesciotta, Note, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz,
Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 243
(2012) (lauding the Warshak opinion’s “demonstra[tion] [of] . . . why third-party doctrine
fails to frustrate citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail.”).
25. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 17.
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Amendment, updated for the 21st century, ought to protect—
like an invitation to transform doctrine, rather than following
carefully in its tread.
I take it as axiomatic that we would prefer a legal order in
which judges are inclined toward this sort of “critical turn”—the
crying-foul exemplified in Warshak—than a legal order in which
that inclination has vanished. This is an axiom not because I
expect all readers to agree (though I hope many do), but because
I am not embarking on a full justification here. I will settle,
instead, for the conditional claim. If we think that it is important
for judges, especially federal judges, to play skeptic in the face of
social and technological changes, especially when those changes
rework the basic interface between state power and individual
liberty, it can be valuable for judges to have distance from the
immediacy of the social world. Where a layperson might acclimate
effortlessly to social and technological evolution, it seems to me
that we want, and should be able to expect, a greater threshold of
reluctance from judges. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit judges in
Warshak did not appear very well versed in the intricacies of
commercial ISP providers. In truth, they did not even seem all that
familiar with how email works. But the result of this unfamiliarity
was not paralysis or poor judgment. It was well-founded dismay.
Factual naiveté coalesced with constitutional wisdom.
Here, Posner could reasonably object that nothing in my
account actually disrupts his position. Is there any real tension,
one might ask, between the call for judges to become familiar
enough with existing technology to perform coherent legal
analysis, and the idea that judicial skepticism in the face of
changing technology can serve important normative ends? In
theory, I suppose the answer is no: the two claims are not
analytically irreconcilable. One can imagine a judge who is at once
attuned to the realities of technological change and sensitive to
the disquiet that new technology can, and often should, inspire.
Perhaps Posner himself is such a judge. On the margins, however,
I remain dubious that the boundary between familiarity and
desensitization can be so readily navigated.
The danger of poor navigation is a stark one. It is the danger
of technocratic competency overshadowing normative
judgment—a live danger in a world where repression often steps
softly, buttressed by little fanfare but copious memoranda. Little
wonder that legal skepticism in the face of technological change
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often adopts an overt vocabulary of totalitarianism. 26 We worry,
and rightly, about the ease with which the abuses of today
metamorphose into the norms of tomorrow. Ultimately, the point
is not that realism should be rejected, just that it cannot fully
account for what is worthwhile about the judicial role. Judges
should be familiar with social and technological reality, just not
too familiar. If realism is a judicial virtue, so is discomfort. And
should the two ever come to clash, I have little doubt about which
ought to prevail.

26. In the Fourth Amendment setting, see, for example, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 n.5 (1979) (comparing the deterioration of the Fourth Amendment to the onset
of “totalitarian” conditions); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he
increasing amount of personal information flowing to the government poses significant
problems . . . [and could] result in the slow creep toward a totalitarian state.”); cf. Jed
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (using the “totalitarian”
specter of “the ubiquitous deployment of secret police spies” as a plea for retooling the
conceptual foundations of Fourth Amendment law). For examples in the Fifth
Amendment setting, see, for example, William Federspiel, 1984 Arrives: Thought(crime),
Technology, and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 865, 900 (2008) (“Orwell
may have missed the mark by a few decades, but the technology that he feared would lead
to unbreakable totalitarian society is now visible on the horizon.”).

